A right of access to health care services is among the economic and social rights guaranteed by the Constitution of South Africa. Given the jurisprudential novelty of such a right and its dependence on economic resources, however, its realization is likely to be difficult to secure. The article discusses the scope and limitations of the right of access to health care in South Africa. Though the country's courts have yet to develop clear principles for interpreting a right of access to health care services, the more significant obstacles to the full enjoyment of this right are the country's pervasive poverty, gross income disparities, and extremely high burden of disease.
(b) sufficient food and water; and (c) social security, including, if they are unable to support themselves and their dependents, appropriate social assistance. (2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of each of these rights. (3) No one may be refused emergency medical treatment (emphasis added).4
The purpose of this article is threefold: first, to explain the significance of a right to health care within the peculiarities of the South African health care system; second, to consider the scope of the right of access to health care; and third, to examine the limits of the realization of such a right in a country at South Africa's level of economic development.
Significance
In one sense, Section 27 vindicates the indivisibility and interdependence of human rights that has been espoused in human rights jurisprudence.5 It is an affirmation of the confluence between civil/political rights and socioeconomic rights and, thus, challenges the classical liberal assumption that the latter are too polycentric and too politically charged to be amenable to adversarial adjudication.6 Notwithstanding the doctrine of separation of powers, it is apparent from the language of Section 27(2) in particular that courts are given jurisdiction to adjudicate over matters of policy, including budgetary appropriations. Indeed, in Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly, the Constitutional Court, the country's highest court, expressly acknowledged such a jurisdiction.7
In a more immediate sense, however, Section 27 is an integral part of the transformation of the social, political, and economic fabric of South African society that began with the election to office of the African National Congress (ANC) in 1994, marking the demise of apartheid.8 In this sense, Section 27 seeks to redress the past by making a fundamental break with a health care system that had historically been saturated with unfathomable disparities.9 The lottery of income, geographical location, and race, in partic-ular, had been for three centuries the primary determinant of the quantity and quality of health care services received by South Africans.10 Especially in apartheid South Africa, the health care system was used as one of many political superstructures to shore up white supremacy."1 Whites disproportionately enjoyed the bulk of public expenditure on health care, receiving four times more per capita than their African counterparts.12 Coloureds (people of mixed racial parentage) and Indians enjoyed a somewhat intermediate position.'3 Extreme differentials in income distribution and the ruralurban chasm accentuated the racial inequalities and assured that the least-favored population groups Africans in particular and, to a lesser extent, Coloureds and Indians had the worst health outcomes. Africans, being disproportionately poor and concentrated in rural areas with little access to effective health care services, ended up with the worst outcomes with respect to infant mortality rates, morbidity rates, life expectancy and so on.14 Section 27 is egalitarian in orientation and complements Section 9 of the Constitution, known as the equality clause.'5 Section 27 seeks to secure not only formal equality, so that extraneous factors such as race, gender, or HIV status cease to be a barrier to services, but also substantive equality, so that other social disadvantages, including income and geographical location, are eliminated or ameliorated. It confers not only a negative right, under which the state or individuals should refrain from adversely and unjustifiably interfering with an individual's right to secure health care services. Even more significantly, it confers a positive right to receive health care from the state. It represents a realization that securing health for everyone is an integral part of securing equality of opportunity in a democracy. The provision of health is a collective interest that entails distributive justice and necessitates going beyond the Aristotelian minimal principle of justice. Thus, given the history of entrenched structural inequality, it would not be enough simply to treat everyone the same way. To achieve meaningful equality, it is necessary to take into account factors such as income and geographical location HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS 29 that may constitute impediments to equal access to health care services.
Scope
Though Section 27 has both vertical and horizontal applications, in that it is enforceable against the state as well as individuals, its importance lies in the former, not least because the state had historically played a dominant role in maintaining an inequitable and iniquitous health care system. Moreover, the state has a legitimate interest in, and monopoly over, the provision of social goods. The private sector, with its emphasis on profit, is ill-suited to assuage social needs. Indeed, in South Africa's case, private health care is inaccessible to all but a minority it provides coverage for only 20% of the population-but, at the same time, it consumes a disproportionate share of national wealth, commanding 60% of the resources that are spent on health care.'6 The medical schemes that finance private health care have historically been biased against the chronically sick, elderly, and poorly remunerated sections of the population in favor of the younger, healthier, and better remunerated. Because of repeated waves of privatization of health care during the apartheid era, the state eventually assumed the responsibility of providing care for the 80% of the population that the private sector deems uninsurable.17 But is Section 27 robust enough to impose tangible obligations against the state? Does it not allow the state an inordinate margin of discretion, thus unduly circumscribing or even nullifying the content of the right? Is it not yet another paper lion, worthy of skepticism from proponents of the rights to health and health care?'8 The answer is both yes and no.
Yes, in the sense that Section 27 is susceptible to the same criticisms of vagueness and imprecision that have been directed at Article 2.1 of the ICESCR, to which it bears a strong resemblance.19 Its language is that of compromise and flexibility. It does not define the quantity or quality of health care services to be accessed. Though, like the ICESCR, it imposes a mandatory injunction, it adopts a gradualist or incremental approach by requiring only pro-gressive rather than immediate realization. It can even be argued that Section 27 is weaker than the ICESCR in that it requires recourse only to "available" rather than "the maximum of its available" resources, and thus insufficiently impresses upon the state the importance of deploying optimally all feasible resources, including international assistance.
But the answer is also no, in the sense that Section 27 is a realistic formulation. The concept of health care is inherently relative and acutely sensitive to the quantity of resources that a state can realistically marshal. To attempt to define the quantity or quality of health care to be received in rigid or precise terms would raise false expectations. In any event, the quasi-legal interpretation by the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) of obligations imposed by the ICESCR, for example, suggests that it is open to courts to develop principles to ensure that the state diligently adheres to the spirit and intent of the Constitution.20 It is commonly accepted that provisions of the South African Bill of Rights must be interpreted generously.21 The obligations imposed by Section 27 are neither open-ended nor without time constraints. The state should, at the very least, begin by meeting minimal or basic needs as proclaimed, for example, in the Alma-Ata Declaration.22 A right of access to health care means being able to access health care that is affordable, available, and effective. It means prioritizing primary health care so as to prevent and control local endemic diseases, immunize against major infectious diseases, treat common diseases and injuries, and provide essential medicines. It also means prioritizing care to vulnerable groups, with particular emphasis on women and children. In short, the state must, as a starting point, seek to deliver a package of essential health services according to universal standards within a scheduled period of time.
The efficacy of Section 27 as a justiciable instrument for creating an equitable and egalitarian health care system will in part depend on the capacity and willingness of the judiciary to inquire robustly into alleged breaches of state socioeconomic obligations. It is incumbent upon the Constitutional Court especially to go beyond the traditional approach to judicial review when reviewing the constitutionality of administrative action or inaction in respect of the obligations in Section 27. That is to say, it is not sufficient merely to inquire whether the administrative action or inaction satisfies the requirements of legality, jurisdiction, and rationality in the traditional sense of judicial review.23 Courts must develop new and appropriate tests, similar to those developed under international human rights jurisprudence, for determining whether there has been a failure to marshal and deploy available resources to progressively realize a specific right and, if so, whether the failure can be justified.24 Inquiring into state budgetary decisions and appropriations is a concomitant part of the court's jurisdiction in this regard.
The recent case of Soobramoney v Minister of Health (Kwa-Zulu Natal), the first in which the Constitutional Court was asked to interpret the enforcement of a quintessentially socioeconomic right against the state, casts doubt on whether there is sufficient judicial enthusiasm to depart from the traditional mould of judicial review.25 The appellant, 41 years old, was in the final stages of chronic renal failure. He had been receiving renal dialysis through private care, but he had exhausted his funds. Without dialysis, he would die. He sought dialysis from a state renal unit, but his request was declined on account of limited resources. The unit's budget allocation from the provincial health authority did not allow for sufficient dialysis machines, bed space, or health care personnel to meet the demand for dialysis. It had, in consequence, devised criteria for rationing dialysis that essentially excluded any patient who had a poor prognosis or would require long-term or life-long dialysis. The appellant was not only diabetic; he also suffered from heart and vascular disease. This meant that he was not a candidate for kidney transplant and would require permanent dialysis. For these reasons he was turned down. He approached the courts contending that he had a constitutional right to receive renal dialysis.
The appellant based his claim on the right to not be refused emergency care in Section 27(3) and the right to life in Section 11 of the South African Constitution, rather than The Constitutional Court also found that the right-tolife argument was unnecessary, as the Constitution contained specific provisions dealing with access to health care. Indeed it was the Court's opinion that the appellant's claim should have been based on Section 27(1) rather than on Sections 27(3) or 11. The Court opined, nonetheless, that the applicant would not have succeeded on Section 27(1) because the resources at the command of the unit, as allocated by the provincial health authority, did not allow for meeting the appellant's need. It was proper for health authorities to balance their priorities and ensure that their resources would also be used for preventative health care and medical treatment for persons suffering from illnesses that were not life-threatening.
The Soobramoney decision highlights the availability of resources as the crucial consideration when determining the enforcement of a socioeconomic right against the state. While the Court reached the correct decision on the lack of affordability of lifelong renal dialysis under Sections 27(2) and (3), it was also unduly deferential to executive assertions about budgetary constraints. While the Court was prudent to be slow to interfere with rational decisions made in good faith by the political organs and medical authorities on whom rests the primary responsibility for setting the health care budget, it should not have shied away from its implicit constitutional obligation to inquire sufficiently into budget-ary appropriations when dealing with enforcement of socioeconomic rights.26 In this regard, the Court failed to inquire whether priorities within the provincial and national governments' health-care budgets were in consonance with its constitutional obligations.27 In South Africa, the national and provincial governments have concurrent jurisdiction over the provision of services.28 Moreover, provincial governments derive the bulk of their health budget from appropriations from national coffers. It seems imperative, therefore, when interpreting Section 27 to carry out as broad an inquiry as possible to ensure that all possible resources at the disposal of the state or its organs are taken into account. It is true that, in the Soobramoney case, such an exhaustive inquiry would not have altered the outcome of the case; lifelong renal dialysis is prohibitively expensive for a country at South Africa's level of economic development. It would, however, have allowed for the development of more appropriate judicial standards for measuring the state's compliance with its duties under Section 27 and other socioeco- The Grootboom case, in contrast, provides some parallels with Soobramoney in that the applicants' arguments were based in part on a constitutional right subject to progressive realization. The applicants in Grootboom, who were homeless, sought to enforce before the High Court the right to have access to adequate housing (Section 26) and the right of every child to basic shelter (Section 28). They succeeded in respect to Section 28 but not Section 26. The applicants succeeded on their Section 28 argument mainly because the section provides for rights intended for immediate rather than progressive realization. According to the court, the right to basic shelter was an unqualified constitutional right, and it was therefore not appropriate to consider whether the state had the requisite resources. The right had to be satisfied by the state without delay. To this extent, Section 28 is not directly analogous to Section 27(2). The case, however, does demonstrate a willingness on the part of the judiciary to enforce a socioeconomic right even in the face of a plea of budgetary constraints on the part of the executive.
On the other hand, the Section 26 argument in the Grootboom case provides an analogy with Section 27. Section 26(2) requires the state to take reasonable legislative and other measures within its available resources to achieve HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS the progressive realization of the right of everyone to have access to adequate housing. The court found that the respondents had not failed in discharging their duty under Section 26(2). They were faced with a massive shortage in available housing and an extremely constrained budget. Moreover, against the backdrop of pressing demands and scarce resources, the respondents had implemented a housing program in an attempt to maximize available resources to redress the housing shortage.
Although the applicants did not succeed on the Section 26 argument, the approach of the court in this case does hold a promise for the enforcement of socioeconomic rights intended for progressive realization. Unlike the Constitutional Court in Soobramoney, the High Court in the Grootboom case attempted to adjudicate the issue of progressive realization of a socioeconomic right with reference to, inter alia, approaches that have been developed in international human rights jurisprudence. For example, the court alluded to the General Comment No. 3 of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) on the nature of the State's obligation with respect to Article 2.1 of the ICESCR.31 The court also drew from the Limburg Principles.32 In the absence of precedent, such an approach is more suited to the interpretation of socioeconomic provisions than the traditional judicial review approach that prevailed in Soobramoney.
Other Constraints
Of course, the Constitution is not the only instrument for facilitating a right of access to health care services. Indeed, the overall importance of the Constitution lies in its being an enabling instrument, which must necessarily be underpinned by other legal instruments and policies. So much has been done in this regard by the current government that law and policy are no longer the main impediments to universal access to health care services.33 Rather, South Africa's high burden of disease and trauma, extreme disparities in income, and general poverty are now the main constraints.
Like much of the developing world, South Africa has a disproportionate burden of disease, especially preventable disease. The incidence of HIV/AIDS and TB is alarming. Sub-Saharan Africa has the highest burden of HIV/AIDS globally, and the epidemic has become concentrated in Southern Africa.34 Although South Africa has lagged behind its neighbors in both the timing and the intensity of the epidemic, it now has the fastest-growing epidemic in the world.35 HIV has also aggravated the incidence of tuberculosis, and the country is experiencing the worst global incidence of TB.36 There are also peculiarly high rates of road traffic accidents and physical violence.37 The strain that such negative factors places on the health care system and the economy as a whole cannot be overemphasized.38
It is now generally accepted that health is less an outcome of health care services consumed than of general socioeconomic development.39 South Africa has done poorly on securing economic well-being and equitable distribution of wealth. Poverty and unemployment are high. Despite having been called the continent's "economic powerhouse," South Africa's profile of poverty is paradigmatic of that of Africa in general.40 More than half of the population is classified as poor, with women, children, and the rural population disproportionately affected.41 Rural women and children are thus doubly vulnerable. Malnourishment and illiteracy are high. Securing clean drinking water, sanitation, and housing remains a formidable challenge for the government.
South Africa (along with Brazil) has the worst income differentials in the world.42 The poorest 40% of households earn less than 6% of the total income, while the richest 10% earn more than 50%. The strong emphasis on fiscal restraint within the country's current macroeconomic policy may further exacerbate the poverty gap, as it entails reductions in public expenditure.43 Although the country has put in place a bold program for reforming the economy and the health care system, including provision of universal primary health care, it is hostage in the short term to the constraining factors of historical neglect, extreme income differentials, and general poverty. 
